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ABSTRACT
Perceptions of West Virginia Beef Cattle Producers
on Preparedness for an Agroterrorism Attack
Rebecca Laura Ours
Biosecurity is a measure that can help protect beef producers from financial loss
associated with an agroterrorism attack. This study sought to determine West Virginia
beef producers’ perceptions of the potential for agroterrorism and what biosecurity
measures they practice. A mailed questionnaire was sent to a sample population of 355
beef producers, with a response rate of 47.7%. Beef producers in West Virginia agreed
that agroterrorism could happen in the United States and in West Virginia; however, the
majority did not feel it would happen on their farms. A majority of the respondents
indicated they would attend a program on agroterrorism and that their most common
source of information on biosecurity measures was popular agriculture magazines.
Isolating new animals was perceived to be the most important biosecurity measure that
could be practiced on their farms, but less than half of the producers reported that they
isolated new cattle.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The United States Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service
(USDA-ARS) estimates one in every eight persons works in some part of the
agriculture/food sector (Schneider, Schneider, Webb, Hubbard, & Archer, 2009).
Agriculture and food production account for 13 percent of the United States gross
domestic product (GDP), 18 percent of its employment, and 140 billion dollars in
revenue (USDA, 2006). Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of detrimental
agents, biological and otherwise, into the agricultural and food processing system with
the intent of causing actual or perceived harm (Schneider, et al., 2009). An agroterrorism
attack could affect many people throughout the world. However, a study by DeGraw
(2005) found that many beef producers in Florida did not think it was necessary to be
prepared for an agroterrorism attack.
Food production is one of the largest industries in the United States. If the food
supply of America would be attacked, it would be hard for people to survive. Maintaining
a safe food supply is a necessity. Contamination and adulteration of food for a target
population could be an ideal target for terrorist attacks. Terrorists could attack the U.S.
and no one would ever realize it until it had already made a huge impact on people. The
international trade of agricultural goods is crucial to the U.S. (Schneider et al., 2009). If
the agricultural industry in the U.S. is attacked, the financial losses would be devastating
not only to producers in the U.S., but other countries as well.
Bioterrorism is defined as the use of a biological agent in a deliberate, harmful
attack, or terrorism using the weapons of biological warfare such as anthrax, smallpox, or
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other pathogens (Schneider et al., 2009). Bioterrorism can target not only the agriculture
industry, but also, the general population. The anthrax incident in the U.S. postal system
after September 11 is an example of a bioterrorism attack (Schneider et al., 2009).
Awareness of food security in the United States was heightened after the
September 11th attack. On June 12, 2002, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 was signed in to law by Congress (Schneider et
al., 2009). The Act was established to help prevent a bioterrorism attack on the food
supply in the United States. The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for
implementing regulations on food production and distribution (Schneider et al., 2009).
Consumer demand for beef declines during disease outbreaks in cattle which in
turn impacts production. During an outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in the United States beef production declined for a couple of years (USDA, 2009).
In 2008, 26.56 pounds of beef per person were produced in the United States (USDA,
2009). Decline in demand for beef could result from a number of factors, including
changes in eating habits for health reasons or more vegans, and vegetarians (USDA,
2009).
Biosecurity procedures can help prevent farm visitors from carrying organisms on
to farms and spreading diseases from farm to farm. Farm visitors can pose a risk for
many reasons, including carrying pathogens from one farm to another. If a visitor has
been out of the country; they pose an increased threat by carrying disease from foreign
soil to a local farm. A biosecurity plan might include requiring visitors to change clothing
and shoes, to disinfecting vehicles, and not having close contact with any animals
(APHIS, 2007). For beef producers an effective biosecurity plan can make their cattle
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less susceptible to diseases, which could prevent loss of income. Preventative measures
can keep cattle safe from diseases and other harmful organisms. Proper nutrition and
management practices including a clean environment will reduce susceptibility to
diseases (APHIS, 2007).
There are broadly based convictions that producers livelihoods and the public are
best served by organizing, funding, and enforcing strict disease control guidelines
through government intervention (Dargatz, & Dargatz, 2002). Government agencies have
mandated biosecurity plans for livestock producers. The aim of specific biosecurity
programs is to combat specific health hazards on the farm such as BSE, Foot and Mouth
Disease, Rabies, and Influenza (Valergakis, Aresenos, & Konomou, 2008). However, the
lack of direct or perceived incentives to adopting biosecurity technologies on beef cattle
farms has resulted in few beef producers who are implementing recommended
biosecurity practices.
Biosecurity includes prevention and security. Prevention is the most important
and cost effective line of defense against harmful organisms (Meyerson, & Reaser, 2002).
Studies have found that producers are not following good management practices or
implementing biosecurity plans (DeGraw, 2005). Failure to follow biosecurity
recommendations poses a great risk of introducing diseases to the cattle herd.
Management practices such as vaccinating on schedule and quarantining new animals
brought on the farm can help prevent outside organisms from infecting the existing herds
(Sanderson, Dargatz, & Garry, 2000).
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Problem Statement
There are 10,653 beef producers in West Virginia. Unlike the poultry industry
where biosecurity plans are required for each operation, beef producers are not required
to have biosecurity plans. Are West Virginia beef producers aware of biosecurity
practices and the impact the lack of biosecurity practices can have on their farms due to
diseases and potential financial loss? What are West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions
of the potential for an agroterrorism attack and what biosecurity measures are they
practicing?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’
perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented
biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of
knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their
information regarding biosecurity practices?
Objectives of the Study
The following objectives were used to guide the research:
1. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an agroterrorism attack.
2. Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef producers.
3. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk related to bioterrorism
and agroterrorism.
4. Identify where West Virginia beef producers go for information on biosecurity.
5. Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery methods for
receiving information on bioterrorism and agroterrorism.
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CHAPTER II
Review of Literature
Realization that food security could be an issue in the United States became more
evident after the September 11, 2001 terrorism attack. After the attack more precautions
and regulations were put into effect for many areas of the economy. Agriculture was
more vulnerable to terrorists because it was one way to hurt mass numbers of people and
the economy. Soon afterward the attack new rules and guidelines were developed to
reduce the agriculture industry’s vulnerability. On June 12, 2002, the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 was signed in to law
(Schneider, et. al, 2009). According to Schneider, Schneider, Webb, Hubbard, and
Archer (2009) the U.S. has not been the victim of a large-scale, successful agroterrorism
attack. The Act was designed to improve the ability of the U.S. to prevent, prepare for,
and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies (Schneider, et al, 2009).
Kelly (2005) states that it seems obvious, that the need for adequate biosecurity measures
on our farms should not be allowed to wait until agroterrorism becomes a reality.
Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of detrimental agents, biological and
otherwise, into the agricultural and food processing system with the intent of causing
actual or perceived harm (Schneider, et al., 2009). There are many broad areas of
agriculture that can provide targets for an agroterrorism attack such as; livestock and
farm animals, plant crops, food processing, distribution, and retailing.
Bioterrorism is defined as the use of a biological agent in a deliberate, harmful
attack, or terrorism using the weapons of biological warfare such as anthrax, smallpox, or
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other pathogens (Schneider, et al., 2009). A bioterrorism attack can be directed at
agriculture, the general public, domestic infrastructure or personnel.
Veterinary medicine has found that biosecurity measures can protect farms. The
veterinary profession is presently challenged with developing and maintaining on-farm
biosecurity protocols to protect the nation’s food supply from acts of bioterrorism, from
the growing threat of foreign animal disease, and from multidrug resistance among
pathogenic organisms. Veterinarians have seen that farmers are resistant to implementing
biosecurity practices until an agroterrorism attack becomes a reality. Veterinarians
indicate that this is an issue and that farmers should not wait for an attack to occur (Kelly,
2005). The challenge comes at a time when the supply of food animal veterinarians in the
U.S. is progressively in decline, and raises the possibility that the profession is not
adequately prepared to fulfill its responsibilities to the health and productivity of the U.S.
livestock and poultry populations (Kelly, 2005).
The United States Department of Agriculture (2006) stated that agriculture and
food production accounts for thirteen percent of the United States’ gross domestic
product; eighteen percent of its employment; and one hundred and forty billion dollars in
revenue. There is an increased awareness of the vulnerability of agriculture and food
products to agroterrorism attacks. The United Sates Department of Agriculture (USDA)
and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are charged with ensuring the safety of
America’s food supply. It is their job to assure the American people that the food coming
from the farm will remain safe until it reaches the consumer.
The goal of biosecurity is to stop the transmission of disease causing agents by
preventing, minimizing or controlling cross-contamination of body fluids between
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animals, animals to feed and animals to equipment that may directly and indirectly
contact animals (Buhman, Dewett, & Griffin, 2007). Biosecurity is a sum of risk
management practices as a defense against biological threats (Meyerson, & Reaser,
(2002).
The United States (U.S.) has identified as priorities, the protection of national
systems and infrastructure such as the transportation, communication, water supply, and
agriculture networks, to defend against terrorism. (Schneider, et al., 2009), but holes in
prevention, preparedness, and response remain. Government agencies have been involved
with most of the well-defined programs of biosecurity for livestock producers.
It is important for farmers to be able to get information on biosecurity and then to
implement a biosecurity plan on their farm. While developing and maintaining
biosecurity can be difficult, it is the cheapest, most effective means of disease control
available, and no disease prevention program will work without it (Buhman, Dewett, &
Griffin, 2007). While it may not be possible for individuals to prevent a disease from
arriving on our nation’s shores, biosecurity practices can reduce the risk of introducing a
disease onto a farm or spreading it to neighboring farms (APHIS, 2007).
Failure to follow biosecurity practices leaves farms unprotected and exposed to
many potentially harmful things. On the farm, one of the greatest risks comes from
bringing new animals onto the premises or comingling or exposing your animals to other
animals. It is a common way to introduce new disease-causing organisms (APHIS, 2007).
Some basic facts that would help farmers to limit biosecurity risks on their farms would
be to understand the need to quarantine animals for at least 30 days when first brought on
to a farm, not to use manure machinery for feeding, not to share equipment with other
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farmers, or allow farm visitors on the farm without proper preventive measures. To
prevent potential hazards farmers should keep their animals healthy through proper
nutrition and avoid stress to help build and keep their immunity. When vehicles enter a
farm they should be disinfected, a farm should be kept clean, and one should be vigilant
to prevent any potential risks. Farmers must also remember that wildlife can carry
diseases that can infect livestock (APHIS, 2007).
According to the USDA in 2006, U.S. agriculture generated over $1 trillion
annually, including $50 billion in exports. One in every eight Americans worked in some
area of food production. One disease outbreak in the food production chain can cause
food prices to go up. Even without agroterrorism, livestock and crop disease cost the U.S.
economy billions of dollars annually (Schneider, et al, 2009). If an agroterrorism event
occurred in the U.S. the potential for disruption to the export markets would be immense.
International trade is crucial as it provides a market for a major part of our crop
production, and growing share of meat output. Proportionately, the U.S. agriculture
industries rely on export markets more heavily than other sectors of the U.S. economy.
An agroterrorism event that instigated fear or even uncertainty in our international
customers could be financially devastating to U.S. agriculture interests (Schneider, et al,
2009). The deliberate introduction of a pathogen into the U.S. livestock, poultry, or crops
could cause a disease outbreak. Jayarao, Tewari, and Wolfgang (nd.) stated that the
outcome of an outbreak could be devastating, resulting in the loss of livestock, disruption
of animal agriculture industry and decreased food production. This would drive food
prices up, halt valuable exports, and ultimately cost taxpayers billions of dollars in lost
revenue and industry renewal costs.
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The recent terrorist attack on the U.S. raised serious concerns on the vulnerability
of plant and animal agriculture in the U.S. As a result of the detection of only one case of
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S. in December 2003, most countries
banned U.S. beef causing the industry to lose between 3.2 and 4.7 billion dollars in 2004.
Two years later, Japan and South Korea, which together account for over 50 percent of
beef exports, had not lifted the ban (DHS, 2005). On June 26, 2006 the ban was lifted off
of the United States, and beef was once again exported to Japan (Clemens, 2007).
Experts warn that the American food supply system could be a target of a terrorist
attack. While testifying before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on
July 20, 2005, Mr. John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, stated, “Most people do not equate terrorist attacks with
agroterrorism. But the threat is real, and the impact could have both severe public health
and economic consequences, while damaging the public’s confidence in the food we eat.”
(DHS, 2005).
According to a March 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
entitled “Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but
Important Challenges Remain,” Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
communication with state and local officials and coordination of federal activities is
lacking. The GAO reported a lack of communication between DHS and states regarding
the development of emergency response plans, grant guidance, and best practices. State
and industry officials reported that there is no mechanism to share lessons learned from
exercises or real-life animal disease outbreaks. The GAO report also stated that
shortcomings exist in the Department of Homeland Securities’ federal coordination of
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national efforts to protect against agroterrorism. The lack of DHS leadership on
agriculture security can be seen in the June 2004 incident in Washington State where 18
head of cattle developed chromium contamination. Agroterrorism was suspected, yet
neither USDA nor DHS were notified for over a week (DHS, 2005).
In today’s agriculture industries various trends are present that could potentially
increase the spread and prevalence of infectious disease in cattle herds (Wolfgang, n.d.).
The concern regarding infectious diseases spurred by the spread and economic
devastation wrought by Foot and Mouth Disease in Britain, this is an excellent time to
reinforce the need for a biosecurity program (Wolfgang, n.d.).
While biosecurity measures have historically benefited agriculture by reducing
crop and livestock losses, as well as costs associated with control programs, there have
also been benefits to human health and the environment through the reduced use of
pesticides and the exclusion of some invasive alien species (Meyerson & Reaser, 2002).
Some of the policies and activities undertaken by USDA suggest that the department is
willing and able to move toward a comprehensive biosecurity approach (Meyerson, &
Reaser, 2002).
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service’s and the Veterinary Service program maintains a high level of emergency
preparedness, and provides the needed resources to respond to eliminate disease
outbreaks in this country. In order to effectively protect against such outbreaks, it will
take the help of veterinarians, livestock producers, as well as, state and local governments
(APHIS, 2007).
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Summary
Realization that food security could be an issue in the United States became
evident after the September 11, 2001 terrorism attack. The goal of biosecurity is to stop
the transmission of disease causing agents by preventing, minimizing or controlling
cross-contamination of body fluids between animals, animals to feed and animals to
equipment that may directly and indirectly contact animals (Buhman, Dewett, & Griffin,
2007). While developing and maintaining biosecurity is the cheapest, most effective
means of disease control available, and no disease prevention program will work without
it (Buhman, Dewett, & Griffin, 2007). Which raises the question of how do West
Virginia beef producers perceive the risks and what preventive measures do they practice?
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CHAPTER III
Methodology
Problem Statement
There are 10,653 beef producers in West Virginia. Unlike the poultry industry
where biosecurity plans are required for each operation, beef producers are not required
to have biosecurity plans. Are West Virginia beef producers aware of biosecurity
practices, and the impact the lack of biosecurity practices can have on their farms due to
diseases and potential financial loss? What are West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions
of the potential for an agroterrorism attack and what biosecurity measures are they
practicing?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’
perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented
biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of
knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their
information regarding biosecurity practices?
Objectives of the Study
The following objectives were used to guide the research:
1. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an agroterrorism attack.
2. Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef producers.
3. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk related to bioterrorism
and agroterrorism.
4. Identify where West Virginia beef producers’ go for information on biosecurity.
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5. Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery methods for
receiving information on bioterrorism and agroterrorism.
Research Design
A descriptive research design using a mailed questionnaire was used to determine
the perceptions of West Virginia beef cattle producers on their preparedness for an
agroterrorism attack. A questionnaire was designed to determine what biosecurity
practices are being implemented by beef producers in West Virginia. According to Ary,
Jacobs, Razavieh, Sorensen (2006), surveys allow the researcher to measure the attitudes
and opinions of the respondents to collect information from a sample of the target
population.
Population
The target population of this study was all beef producers in West Virginia. Due
to the lack of availability of an official list of beef producers for the state of West
Virginia, the accessible population was selected from a compiled list of participants in the
Southern Bull Test, Beef Quality Assurance Program, members on the West Virginia
Cattleman’s Association mailing list, participants in the South Branch and Weston
livestock markets, and State Livestock Roundup (N =4600). The Krejcie and Morgan
guidelines (1960) were used to determine the total sample size of producers (n=355). A
random sample of 355 producers was selected from the list.
Instrumentation
Mailed questionnaires were sent to 355 beef producers in West Virginia. The
instrument had five parts and consisted of 78 questions. The first part of the questionnaire
consisted of Likert-type questions designed to determine the producers’ perceptions about
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agroterrorism. Each question had five available responses which were: strongly agree,
agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree. The second part of the
questionnaire was designed so the producers’ could rate the level of perceived threat for
various factors, the Likert-type responses included considerable, much, some, little, and
none. The third section was designed to determine where producers would go to gather
information on agroterrorism, using multiple choice questions. Part four was designed to
assess the importance the producer put on selected safeguards and to what degree they
practiced the safeguard. The responses provided for the “importance of the safeguard”
included major, moderate, minor, and no importance. The responses for “degree to
which you practice” were always, moderate, rarely, never, and not applicable. This
section also sought to determine the likelihood of which individual/agency or published
information source the producer would contact for additional information about
agroterrorism livestock specific biosecurity threats. The responses provided included very
likely, fairly likely, likely, unlikely, and very unlikely. Part five was designed to collect
demographic information about the producer and their beef operation.
Validity
The instrument was presented to Livestock Extension Specialists and faculty
members in the department of Agricultural and Extension Education at West Virginia
University to establish its content and face validity. Each individual on the panel had
extensive teaching or Extension experience. The panel determined that the instrument
had content and face validity.
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Reliability
The reliability of the instrument was established using the final data set. Because
the data consisted of nominal and ordinal scale responses, the Spearman Brown split half
statistic was used to establish the instrument’s reliability. The reliability was found to be
exemplary with the coefficient of .758 (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991). The
instrument was established as a reliable measure.
Data Collection Procedures
Dillman’s Tailored Design Method (2007) was used to collect data for this study.
A packet consisting of a cover letter (Appendix A), instrument (Appendix B), and a
postage paid, self-addressed envelope was mailed to the participants on April 13, 2010
and was due back on April 28, 2010. A second packet was sent to all non-respondents on
April 30, 2010. The second mailing consisted of another copy of the instrument, a followup cover letter (Appendix C), and a postage paid, self-addressed envelope. These
individuals were given a deadline of May 17, 2010. A post card was sent to West
Virginia beef producers that did not return a survey before May 17, 2010.
Analysis of Data
The data were entered into an Excel spreadsheet. The data were then transferred
to SPSS for analysis, and the significance level was set a priori at ≤ .05 for all statistical
tests. Descriptive analyses were performed on the data and the appropriate methods of
reporting each type of data were used.
Use of Findings
The findings from this study will be used to draw conclusions about the
perceptions and preparedness of beef cattle producers in West Virginia with regard to

15

agroterrorism and biosecurity. The information gathered will be shared with Extension
personnel, University Animal Science faculty, the State Department of Agriculture and
beef cattlemen’s association to assist them in the development of educational materials
and outreach programs on recommended biosecurity practices.
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CHAPTER IV
Findings
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’
perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented
biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of
knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their
information regarding biosecurity practices?
Objectives of the Study
The following objectives were used to guide the research:
1. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an agroterrorism attack.
2. Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef producers.
3. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk related to bioterrorism
and agroterrorism.
4. Identify where West Virginia beef producers go for information on biosecurity.
5. Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery methods for
receiving information on bioterrorism and agroterrorism.
Findings
The target population for this study consisted of beef producers in West Virginia.
The sample population of 355 was randomly selected. Out of the 355 surveys, 16 were
returned as undeliverable, 5 were returned as deceased, and 7 producers were no longer
farming making the sample population 327. Out of the 327 questionnaires 156 were
returned for a response rate of 47.7%.
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Demographics
One hundred and twenty-four (87.3%) respondents were male while 18 (12.7%)
were female (see Table 1). One hundred and thirty-five (95.1%) respondents had been in
the beef cattle business for more than seven years. Two (1.4%) beef producers indicated
they had been in business for 73 months – 7 years, one (.7%) producer had been in
business for 61 months – 6 years, two (1.4%) respondents had been in business for 49
months – 5 years, while two (1.4%) have only been in business for 37 months - 4 years
(see Table 2).
Table 1
Gender of Participants
Gender

N

%

Male

124

87.3

Female

18

12.7

N

%

37 months – 4 years

2

1.4

49 months – 5 years

2

1.4

61 months – 6 years

1

.7

73 months – 7 years

2

1.4

135

95.1

Table 2
Years in Beef Cattle Business

More than 7 years
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Cattle on Operation
Beef producers were asked the size of their beef cattle herd. Twenty-five (17.6%)
respondents had 1 – 20 animals, 49 (34.5%) had 21 – 50 animals, and 40 (28.2%) had
51 – 100 animals. Thirteen (9.2%) respondents had 101 – 200 animals, 10 (7.0%) had
201 – 300 animals, three (2.1%) had 301 – 500 animals, and two (1.4%) had 500 or more
animals on their farm (see Table 3).
Table 3
Cattle on Operation
N

%

1 - 20 animals

25

17.6

21 – 50 animals

49

34.5

51 – 100 animals

40

28.2

101 – 200 animals

13

9.2

201 – 300 animals

10

7.0

301 – 500 animals

3

2.1

501 + animals

2

1.4

Role in Operation
Beef producers were asked about their roles on their operations, 124 (87.3%)
respondents were owner-operators. Eleven (7.7%) respondents indicated they were the
operator on land they owned, two (1.4%) indicated they were operators on rented-leased
land, and five (3.5%) indicated they had some other type of operation (see Table 4).
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Table 4
Role in Operation
N

%

Owner-Operator

124

87.3

Operator on land you own

11

7.7

Operator on rented-leased
land

2

1.4

Other

5

3.5

Acreage Owned and/or Leased
Respondents were asked about acres owned or leased. Five (3.5%) beef producers
indicated they did not own any land and 55 (39.3%) indicated they did not lease any land.
Forty-six (32.6%) respondents owned land that was less than one acre to 99 acres, while
26 (18.6%) leased land less than one acre to 99 acres (see Table 5).
Thirty-five (24.8%) respondents owned 100 – 249 acres and 23 (16.4%) leased
100 – 249 acres. Thirty (21.3%) beef producers indicated they owned 250 – 499 acres
and 21 (15%) leased 250 – 499 acres. Seventeen (12.1%) respondents owned 500 – 999
and eight (5.7%) leased 500 – 999 acres. Six (4.3%) respondents indicated they owned
1000 – 1999 and four (2.9%) leased 1000 – 1999. Two (1.4%) owned 2000 or more acres
and three (2.1%) leased 2000 or more acres (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Acres Owned or Leased
Acres owned

Acres leased

N

%

N

%

None

5

3.5

55

39.3

Less than 1 acre to 99 acres

46

32.6

26

18.6

100 – 249 acres

35

24.8

23

16.4

250 – 499 acres

30

21.3

21

15.0

500 – 999 acres

17

12.1

8

5.7

1000 – 1999 acres

6

4.3

4

2.9

2000 – or more acres

2

1.4

3

2.1
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Perceptions and Preparedness for an Agroterrorism Attack
Beef producers were asked to indicate their perceptions and preparedness of
agroterrorism. Fifty-three respondents (39.3%) strongly agree that agroterrorism could
happen in the United States, and 70 (51.9%) agreed. Eighty-one respondents (60.0%)
agreed that agroterrorism could happen in West Virginia and of the other respondents 18
(13.3%) agreed. Twenty-seven respondents (20.5%) agreed that an agroterrorism could
happen on their farm, and five (3.8%) strongly agreed (see Table 6).
Ten respondents (7.4%) neither disagree nor agreed, and two (1.5%) strongly
disagreed that an agroterrorism attack could happen in the United States (U.S.). Twentythree respondents (17.0%) neither disagreed nor agreed, nine (6.7%) disagreed, and four
(3.0%) strongly disagreed that an agroterrorism attack could happen in West Virginia.
Fifty-one (38.1%) beef producers neither agreed nor disagreed that agroterrorism could
happen on their farm, 35 (26.5%) disagreed, and eight (6.1%) strongly disagreed (see
Table 6).
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Table 6
Perceptions about Agroterrorism
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

N

%

N

%

Agroterrorism in the USA

2

1.5

0

Agroterrorism in West Virginia

4

3.0

20
8

Agroterrorism on own farm
Preparedness for an agroterrorism
attack

Neither Agree or
Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree

N

%

N

%

N

%

0.0

10

7.4

70

51.9

53

39.3

9

6.7

23

17.0

81

60.0

18

13.3

14.9

27

20.1

51

38.1

34

25.4

2

1.5

6.1

35

26.5

57

43.2

27

20.5

5

3.8
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Perceived Threats to Farm
West Virginia beef producers were asked to rate their level of perceived threat for
several aspects of their farm. With regard to potential for water contamination, 46
(33.6%) respondents indicated that water contamination was of little threat to them.
Forty-six (33.6%) producers indicated water contamination was some threat, 19 (13.9%)
considered it much of a threat, 18 (13.1%) indicated it was a considerable threat, but 17
(12.4%) beef producers said they did not feel that water contamination was a threat (see
Table 7).
When asked about feed contamination, 47 (34.3%) respondents indicated they
perceived feed contamination somewhat of a threat to their farm, while 13 (9.5%)
perceived it to be much of a threat, and 11 (8.0%) saw it as a considerable threat. Fortysix (33.6%) respondents indicated that feed contamination was of little threat to their
farm, while 20 (14.6%) respondents considered feed contamination to be of no threat (see
Table 7).
Sixty-five (48.5%) beef producers indicated that the death of an animal was some
threat on their farm, while, 15 (11.2%) considered it much of a threat, and seven (5.2%)
reported animal death as a considerable threat to their farm. Thirty-two (23.9%)
respondents reported that animal death as of little threat, while, 15 (11.2%) respondents
considered animal death to be no threat on their farm (see Table 7).
Forty-nine (36.6%) respondents indicated that an animal disease outbreak was
some threat to their farm, while 22 (16.4%) considered it much of a threat, and 12 (9.2%)
reported that an animal disease outbreak is a considerable threat to their farm. Thirty-six
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(26.9%) respondents replied that an animal disease outbreak is of little threat, while, 15
(11.2%) considered an animal disease outbreak to be no threat to their farm (see Table 7).
Forty (29.6%) beef producers felt that fertilizer theft misuse was of little threat to
their farm, while 56 (41.5%) felt that fertilizer theft misuse was of no threat. Twentyseven (20.0%) indicated that fertilizer theft misuse was some threat, nine (6.7%)
considered it to be much threat, and three (2.2%) reported that fertilizer theft misuse was
a considerable threat (see Table 7).
Ninety-two (67.6%) respondents reported that employee revenge was of no threat
to their farm, 26 (19.1%) considered it to be of little threat, and 10 (7.4%) responded that
employee revenge could be of some threat to their farm. Three (2.2%) beef producers
reported that employee revenge was a considerable threat to their farm, while, five (3.7%)
felt employee revenge was of much threat to their farm (see Table 7).
Thirty (22.2%) respondents considered chemical contamination to be some threat
to their farm, 10 (7.4%) considered chemical contamination was of much threat, and 5
(3.7%) reported it was a considerable threat. Fifty-four (40.0%) replied that chemical
contamination was of little threat, while, 36 (26.7%) considered it to be of no threat to
their farm (see Table 7).
When asked about Zoonotic illness, 32 (23.9%) indicated they perceived Zoonotic
illness as somewhat of a threat to their farm, while 55 (41.0%) reported that Zoonotic
illness was of little threat, and 35 (26.1%) perceived it to be no threat. Seven (5.2%)
respondents indicated that Zoonotic illness was much of a threat to their farm, while 5
(3.7%) felt it was a considerable threat (see Table 7).
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When respondents were asked about loss of income due to market loss, 35 (25.7%)
perceived it as a considerable threat, while 16 (11.8%) reported it as no threat. Twentytwo (16.2%) respondents reported that loss of income due to market loss was much of a
threat, 34 (25.0%) indicated it as somewhat of a threat, but 29 (21.3%) considered it to be
of little threat to their farm (see Table 7).
Thirty-four (25.2%) respondents considered tampering with facilities somewhat
of a threat to their farm, while 15 (11.1%) perceived it was much of a threat, and 12
(8.9%) indicated it was a considerable threat. Forty (29.6%) respondents felt tampering
with facilities was of little threat and 34 (25.2%) did not feel that it was any threat at all
(see Table 7).
Respondents were asked about the threat of people tampering with fences/gates,
and 36 (26.5%) responded it was somewhat of a threat to their farm. Twenty-seven
(19.9%) considered that the threat of tampering with fences/gates as much of a threat and
19 (14.0%) felt it was a considerable threat. Twenty-nine (21.3%) respondents indicated
they felt tampering with fences/gates was of little threat to their farm, while, 25 (18.4%)
considered it no threat (see Table 7).
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Table 7
Perceived Level of Threat
None

Little

Some

Much

Considerable

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

Water contamination

17

12.4

37

27.0

46

33.6

19

13.9

18

13.1

Feed contamination

20

14.6

46

33.6

47

34.3

13

9.5

11

8.0

Animal death

15

11.2

32

23.9

65

48.5

15

11.2

7

5.2

Animal disease outbreak

15

11.2

36

26.9

49

36.6

22

16.4

12

9.0

Fertilizer theft-misuse

56

41.5

40

29.6

27

20.0

9

6.7

3

2.2

Employee revenge

92

67.6

26

19.1

10

7.4

5

3.7

3

2.2

Chemical contamination

36

26.7

54

40.0

30

22.2

10

7.4

5

3.7

Zoonotic illness

35

26.1

55

41.0

32

23.9

7

5.2

5

3.7

Loss of income due to market loss

16

11.8

29

21.3

34

25.0

22

16.2

35

25.7

Tampering with facilities

34

25.2

40

29.6

34

25.2

15

11.1

12

8.9

Tampering with fences-gates

25

18.4

29

21.3

36

26.5

27

19.9

19

14.0

9

60.0

1

6.7

1

6.7

1

6.7

3

20.0

Other
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Attended Workshop on Biosecurity-Agroterrorism
West Virginia beef producers were asked if they had ever attended a workshop on
biosecurity-agroterrorism. Twenty-eight (20.6%) beef producers said they have attended
a biosecurity-agroterrorism workshop at least once, 11 (8.1%) more than once, and 97
(71.3%) reported they had never attended a workshop (see Table 8).
Table 8
Attended Workshop on Biosecurity-Agroterrorism
N

%

Yes, at least once

28

20.6

More than once

11

8.1

No

97

71.3

Where Producers would Seek Advice in Event of an Act of Agroterrorism
Respondents were asked from whom they would seek advice if they suspected an
act of agroterrorism had occurred on their farm. Seventy-one (51.1%) respondents
indicated they would contact a veterinarian, while, 59 (42.8%) beef producers indicated
they would call an Extension agent (see Table 7). The West Virginia Department of
Agriculture (WVDA) was who 73 of the respondents (52.9%) indicated they would call.
Twenty-two (15.9%) respondents indicated they would contact another livestock
producer, while, 87 (63.0%) respondents indicated they would contact law enforcement
about an importance on agroterrorism attack. Seventeen (12.3%) beef producers reported
they would contact the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for advice on
agroterrorism (see Table 9).
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Five (3.6%) West Virginia beef producers would contact a producer association,
while, six (4.3%) would seek advice from state emergency management. Eleven (8.0%)
respondents reported they would contact the county emergency management for advice in
agroterrorism, nine (6.5%) respondents indicated they would seek advice from Homeland
Security, while, eight (5.8%) indicated they would not know who to contact for advice
and two (1.4%) respondents would contact someone else (see Table 9).
Table 9
Where Producers would Seek Advice in Event of an Act of Agroterrorism
No

Yes

N

%

N

%

Veterinarian

68

48.9

71

51.1

Extension Agent

79

57.2

59

42.8

WV Department of Agriculture

65

47.1

73

52.9

Another livestock producer

116

84.1

22

15.9

Law enforcement

51

37.0

87

63.0

USDA

121

87.7

17

12.3

Producer Association

133

96.4

5

3.6

State Emergency Management

132

95.7

6

4.3

County Emergency
Management

127

92.0

11

8.0

Homeland Security

129

93.5

9

6.5

Don't know

130

94.2

8

5.8

Other (please specify)

136

98.6

2

1.4
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West Virginia beef producers were asked if they had made considerable
investments since September 11, 2001 to make their operation more biosecure. Three
(2.2%) respondents indicated they have made considerable investments to make their
operation more secure before September 11, 2001, 15 (11.0%) made considerable
investments after September 11, while, nine (6.6%) indicated they made investments
before and after September 11, 2001. One hundred and three (75.7%) of the respondents
indicated that the attack on the United States in September 2001 had no influence on their
investments to make their operation more secure and six (4.4%) did not know if they
made any investments for security purposes since the September 2001 attack on the U.S
(see Table 10).
Table 10
Investments Made to Make Operation More Secure
N

%

Yes, before September 11, 2001

3

2.2

Yes, before and after September 11, 2001

9

6.6

Yes, after September 11, 2001

15

11.0

No

103

75.7

6

4.4

Don't know
Importance of Biosecurity Safeguards

The participants were asked about the importance of a biosecurity safeguards and
the degree to which each is practiced on their farm. Fourteen (11.0%) respondents
indicated limiting visitors was a safeguard of major important to their farm, 40 (31.5%)
responded limiting visitors was of moderate importance to their farm, and 51 (41.2%)
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reported it was of minor importance, while 22 (17.3%) respondents indicated that limiting
visitors was of no importance to their farm. Eight (6.3%) respondents reported they
always practice limiting visitors on their farm, 29 (22.7%) indicated they moderately
practice limiting visitors, 39 (30.5%) indicated they rarely practice limiting visitors, 36
(28.1%) never practice limiting visitors, while, 16 (12.5%) indicated that limiting visitors
to their farm was not applicable (see Table 11).
Eleven (8.8%) respondents indicated it was of major importance to require a
waiting period for visitors from other farms, 32 (25.6%) reported it was of moderate
importance, and 45 (36.0%) responded it was of minor importance. Thirty-seven (29.6%)
indicated that requiring a waiting period for visitors from other farms is of no importance.
Six (4.6%) respondents reported they always practice having a waiting period for visitors
from other farms, 15 (11.5%) indicated they moderately practice waiting periods, 30
(23.1%) rarely practiced waiting periods, while, 56 (43.1%) never practice waiting
periods for visitors from other farms and 23 (17.7%) indicated it was not applicable to
their farm (see Table 11).
Sixty-nine (54.8%) respondents indicated they feel it is of major importance to
isolate a new animal before introducing it to an existing herd, 39 (31.0%) respondents felt
it was of moderate importance, and 10 (7.8%) felt it was of minor importance. Eight
(6.23%) respondents felt it is of no importance to isolate new animals before introducing
them to the existing herd. Sixty-four (49.2%) beef producers reported they always
practice isolating new animals before introducing them to the existing herd, 36 (27.7%)
moderately practice isolating new animals, 15 (11.5%) rarely practice isolating new
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animals, and eight (6.2%) never practice, while seven (5.4%) indicated it was not
applicable to their farm (see Table 11).
Seven (5.8%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to require
employees to wear overalls, 23 (19.2%) respondents felt it was of moderate importance
for employees to wear overalls, and 36 (30.0%) felt it was of minor importance. Fiftyfour (45.0%) respondents felt it was not important to require employees to wear overalls.
Five (3.9%) respondents indicated they always require employees to wear overalls, seven
(5.4%) respondents indicate they moderately require their employees to wear overalls, 18
(14.0%) rarely require their employees to wear overalls, and 48 (37.2%) never require
their employees to wear overalls, while, 51 (39.5%) felt it was not applicable to their
farm (see Table 11).
Seven (5.8%) respondents indicated it is of major importance for their employees
to wear shoe covers, 27 (22.5%) respondents indicate employees wearing shoe covers is
of moderate importance, and 31 (25.8%) felt it is of minor importance. Fifty-five (45.8%)
respondents felt it is of no importance to have employees wear shoe covers. Four (3.1%)
respondents reported they always practice making employees wear shoe covers, eight
(6.2%) respondents moderately practice, 14 (10.8%) respondents indicated they rarely
practice employees wearing shoe covers, and 52 (40.0%) never have their employees
wear shoe covers, while 52 (40.0%) indicated it was not applicable to their farm (see
Table 11).
Nine (7.4%) respondents indicated it was of major importance to have visitors use
a footbath, 26 (21.3%) respondents indicated it was of moderate importance, and 41
(33.6%) felt it was of minimal importance. Forty-six (37.7%) respondents felt it was of
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no importance to require visitors to use footbaths. One (.8%) respondent indicated they
always require visitors to use footbaths, 5 (3.9%) respondents moderately require
footbaths, 13 (10.2%) respondents rarely require footbaths, 73 (57.0%) never require
footbaths and 36 (28.1%) felt using footbaths was not applicable to their farm (see Table
11).
Five (4.2%) respondents indicated it was of major importance for employees to
use footbaths, 22 (18.6%) respondents indicated it was of moderate importance, and 37
(31.4%) felt it was of minor importance for employees to use footbaths. Fifty-four
(45.8%) respondents felt it was of no importance to require employees to use footbaths.
One (.8%) respondent reported they always require employees to use footbaths, three
(2.3%) reported they moderately require employees to use footbaths, 11 (8.6%) rarely
require their employees to use footbaths, and 60 (46.9%) indicated they never require
employees to use footbaths, while, 53 (41.4%) felt requiring employees to use footbaths
was not applicable to their farm (see Table 11).
Five (4.2%) respondents indicated it is of major importance that they require their
visitors to wear gloves, 19 (16.0%) respondents felt it was of moderate importance, and
39 (32.8%) felt it is of minor importance. Fifty-six (47.1%) respondents felt it is of no
importance to require visitors to wear gloves. Two (1.6%) respondents always require
visitors to wear gloves, eight (6.3%) respondents indicated they moderately require
visitors to wear gloves, 15 (11.9%) respondents rarely require visitors to wear gloves.
Sixty-two respondents (49.2%) never require visitors to wear gloves and 39 (31.0%) felt
requiring visitors to wear gloves is not applicable to their farm (see Table 11).
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Seven (6.1%) respondents indicated it is of major importance for employees to
wear gloves, 26 (22.8%) indicated it is of moderate importance, and 34 (29.8%) felt it is
of minor importance. Forty-seven (41.2%) respondents felt it is of no importance for
employees to wear gloves. Three (2.3%) respondents always require their employees to
wear gloves, 18 (14.1%) respondents moderately require their employees to wear gloves,
10 (7.8%) respondents rarely require their employees to wear gloves, and 51 (39.8%)
never require gloves to be worn by their employees, while 46 (35.9%) indicated requiring
employees to wear gloves is not applicable to their farm (see Table 11).
Ten (8.3%) respondents indicated it was of major importance to require visitors to
stop at a biosecurity checkpoint before entering the farm, 21 (17.5%) indicated it is of
moderate importance and 26 (21.7%) felt it was of minor importance to have visitors to
stop at a biosecurity checkpoint when entering the farm. Sixty-three (52.5%) respondents
feel that it was of no importance for requiring visitor to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint
when entering the farm. One (.8%) respondent indicated they always have visitors to stop
at a biosecurity checkpoint when entering the farm, four (3.2%) respondents moderately
require visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint, nine (7.1%) respondents indicated
they rarely require visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint, and 68 (54.0%) never
require visitors to stop at a biosecurity checkpoint when they enter the farm, while 44
(34.9%) felt it was not applicable to their farm (see Table 11).
Two (1.7%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to require people
entering the farm to shower, seven (5.9%) respondents indicated it was of moderate
importance, and 27 (22.9%) felt it was of minor importance. Eighty-two (69.5%)
respondents felt it was of no importance to have people shower before entering the farm.
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There were no respondents that felt they always or moderately required people to shower
before entering their farm, four (3.2%) respondents rarely required people to shower
before entering the farm, while, 72 (57.1%) never require people to shower before
entering the farm, while 50 (39.7%) felt it was not applicable to their farm (see Table 11).
Two (1.7%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to require people to
shower before leaving their farm, eight (6.7%) respondents indicated it was of moderate
importance, and 27 (22.7%) indicated it is of minor importance to require people to
shower before leaving the farm. Eighty-two (68.9%) respondents felt it was of no
importance for people to shower before leaving the farm (see Table 9). None of the
respondents always require people to shower before leaving their farm, two (1.6%)
respondents moderately practice requiring people to shower before leaving their farm,
three (2.4%) rarely require showers before leaving and 71 (56.8%) never require visitors
to shower before leaving the farm, while 49 (39.2%) indicated it was not applicable to
their farm (see Table 11).
Seven (6.0%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to require visitors to
disinfect vehicles before entering the farm, 13 (11.2%) respondents indicated it is of
moderate importance, and 23 (19.8%) indicated it was of minor importance. Seventythree (62.9%) respondents felt it was of no importance for visitors to disinfect their
vehicles before entering the farm. Three (2.4%) respondents indicated they always
require visitors to disinfect their vehicle, two (1.6%) respondents indicated they
moderately require visitors to disinfect their vehicle, seven (5.5%) respondents rarely
require visitors to disinfect their vehicles, and 67 (52.8%) never require visitors to
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disinfect their vehicles, while, 48 (37.8%) felt it was not applicable to their operation (see
Table 11).
Nineteen (17.3%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to conduct a
background check on potential hires, 23 (20.9%) respondents indicated it is of moderate
importance, and 18 (16.4%) felt it is of minor importance. Fifty (45.5%) respondents
indicated it is of no importance to require a background check on potential hires. Six
(4.8%) respondents indicated they always practice a background check on potential hires,
10 (8.0%) respondents indicated they moderately required a background check, eight
(6.4%) respondents indicated they rarely perform background checks on potential hires,
and 41 (32.8%) never require a background check, while 60 (48.0%) indicated
background checks were not applicable to their farm (see Table 11).
Nineteen (17.4%) respondents indicated it is of major importance they schedule
regular meetings with their employees to determine their levels of satisfaction, 22 (20.2%)
respondents indicated it is of moderate importance, and 19 (17.4%) felt it is of minor
importance. Forty-nine (45.0%) respondents indicated it was of no importance for regular
schedule meeting to determine levels of satisfaction. Four (3.2%) respondents indicated
they always have meetings with their employees to determine levels of satisfaction, 14
(11.1%) respondents moderately require scheduled meetings, 10 (7.9%) respondents
rarely require scheduled meetings to determine the levels of satisfaction, and 34 (27.0%)
never require scheduled meetings, while, 64 (50.8%) indicated it was not applicable to
their farm (see Table 11).
Twenty-five (22.5%) respondents indicated it is of major importance to have a
training program that will enable employees to quickly recognize or report a disease that
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happens on the farm, 31 (27.9%) respondents indicated it is of moderate importance, and
15 (13.5%) felt it was if minor importance. Forty (36.0%) respondents indicated it is of
no importance to have a training program that will enable employees to quickly recognize
or report a disease that happens on the farm. Six (4.7%) respondents indicated they
always require a training program that will enable employees to quickly recognize or
report a disease that happens on the farm, 24 (18.9%) respondents moderately require
training programs, 8 (6.3%) respondents rarely require training programs for their
employees, and 33 (26.0%) never require trainings for their employees on recognizing
and reporting a disease, while 56 (44.1%) felt it was not applicable to their farm (see
Table 11).
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Table 11
Importance and Practicing of Safeguards on Farm
Importance of the Safeguard
No
Importance
N

%

Minor

Moderate

Degree to Which Practiced
Major

Not
Applicable

Never

Rarely

Moderate

Always

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

Limiting visitors

22 17.3

51

40.2

40

31.5

14

11.0

16

12.5

36

28.1

39

30.5

29 22.7

8

6.3

Requiring a waiting
period for visitors

37 29.6

45

36.0

32

25.6

11

8.8

23

17.7

56

43.1

30

23.1

15 11.5

6

4.6

6.3

10

7.9

39

31.0

69

54.8

7

5.4

8

6.2

15

11.5

36 27.7

64

49.2

Requiring employees
to wear overalls
54 45.0

36

30.0

23

19.2

7

5.8

51

39.5

48

37.2

18

14.0

7

5.4

5

3.9

Requiring employees
to wear shoe covers 55 45.8

31

25.8

27

22.5

7

5.8

52

40.0

52

40.0

14

10.8

8

6.2

4

3.1

Requiring visitors to
use footbaths

46 37.7

41

33.6

26

21.3

9

7.4

36

28.1

73

57.0

13

10.2

5

3.9

1

.8

Requiring employees
to use footbaths
54 45.8

37

31.4

22

18.6

5

4.2

53

41.4

60

46.9

11

8.6

3

2.3

1

.8

Isolating a new

8
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Table 11 (Continued)
Importance and Practicing of Safeguards on Farm
Importance of the Safeguard
No
Importance
N

%

Minor
N

%

Degree to Which Practiced

Moderate
N

%

Major
N

%

Not
Applicable
N

%

Never
N

%

Rarely

Moderate

Always

N

N

N

%

%

%

Requiring visitors to
stop at a biosecurity
63
checkpoint

52.5 26

21.7 21

17.5 10

8.3 44

34.9 68

54.0 9

7.1 4

3.2

1

.8

Requiring visitors to
56
wear gloves

47.1 39

32.8 19

16.0 5

4.2 39

31.0 62

49.2 15

11.9 8

6.3

2

1.6

Requiring employees
47
to wear gloves

41.2 34

29.8 26

22.8 7

6.1 46

35.9 51

39.8 10

7.8 18

14.1

3

2.3

Requiring people
entering the farm to
82
shower

69.5 27

22.9 7

5.9 2

1.7 50

39.7 72

57.1 4

3.2 0

.0

0

.0

Requiring people
leaving the farm to
shower

82

68.9 27

22.7 8

6.7 2

1.7 49

39.2 71

56.8 3

2.4 2

1.6

0

.0

Requiring visitors to
73
disinfect vehicles

62.9 23

19.8 13

11.2 7

6.0 48

37.8 67

52.8 7

5.5 2

1.6

3

2.4
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Table 11 (Continued)
Importance and Practicing of Safeguards on Farm
Importance of the Safeguard
No
Importance
N

%

Minor

Moderate

Degree to Which Practiced
Major

Not
Applicable

Never

Rarely

Moderate

Always

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

Conducting
background checks
on potential hires

50 45.5

18

16.4

23

20.9

19

17.3

60

48.0

41

32.8

8

6.4

10

8.0

6

4.8

Have regular
meetings with
employees

49 45.0

19

17.4

22

20.2

19

17.4

64

50.8

34

27.0

10

7.9

14 11.1

4

3.2

Training program(s)
for employees to a
disease

40 36.0

15

13.5

31

27.9

25

22.5

56

44.1

33

26.0

8

6.3

24 18.9

6

4.7
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Likelihood Producer would Contact an Individual/Agency for Additional
Information about Agroterrorism
Respondents were asked what was the likelihood they would contact an
individual/agency for additional information about agroterrorism, 59 (42.4%) felt they
would very likely contact a veterinarian. Twenty-three (16.5%) respondents indicated it
was fairly likely they would contact a veterinarian, 35 (25.2%) were likely to contact a
veterinarian, but 19 (13.7%) respondents were unlikely to contact a veterinarian and three
(2.2%) beef producers reported they were very unlikely to contact a veterinarian for an
agroterrorism information (see Table 12).
Fifty-nine (42.4%) respondents felt they were very likely to contact an Extension
agent, while, 23 (16.5%) indicated they were fairly likely to contact an Extension agent.
Thirty-five (22.2%) respondents were likely to contact an Extension agent, 19 (13.7%)
indicated they were unlikely to contact Extension personnel, and nine (2.2%) were very
unlikely to contact an Extension agent (see Table 12).
Fifty-six (41.2%) respondents indicated they would very likely contact the West
Virginia Department of Agriculture (WVDA) for information on agroterrorism and
biosecurity, while, 25 (18.4%) respondents were fairly likely to contact the WVDA. Forty
(29.4%) respondents indicated they would likely contact WVDA, 10 (7.4%) indicated
they were unlikely to contact WVDA, and five (3.7%) were very unlikely to contact
WVDA (see Table 12).
Twenty-nine (21.5%) respondents indicated they would very likely contact
another livestock producer, while, 32 (23.7%) respondents were fairly likely to contact
another livestock producer. Forty-six (34.1%) indicated they were likely to contact
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another livestock producer, while, 18 (13.3%) respondents were unlikely to contact
another livestock producer, and 10 (7.4%) were very unlikely to contact another livestock
producer (see Table 12).
Fifty (36.8%) respondents indicated they would very likely to contact law
enforcement for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 20 (14.7%)
respondents were fairly likely to contact law enforcement. Thirty-two 32 (23.5%)
respondents were likely to contact law enforcement, while, 20 (14.7%) were unlikely to
contact law enforcement, and 14 (10.3%) were very unlikely to contact law enforcement
(see Table 12).
Thirty-four (25.2%) respondents indicated they would very likely contact the
United Sates Department of Agriculture (USDA), while, 22 (16.3%) respondents would
fairly likely contact the USDA. Thirty-six (26.7%) respondents were likely to contact the
USDA, while, 31 (23.0%) respondents were unlikely to contact USDA, and 12 (8.9%)
were very unlikely to contact USDA (see Table 12).
Thirteen (9.9%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact a producer
association for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 15 (11.5%)
respondents were fairly likely to contact a producer association. Thirty-seven (28.2%)
respondents were likely to contact a producer association, while, 43 (32.8%) respondents
indicated they were unlikely to contact a producer association, and 23 (17.6%) were very
unlikely to contact a producer association (see Table 12).
Eleven (8.5%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact county and
state emergency management, while, 17 (13.2%) respondents were fairly likely to contact
to county and state emergency management. Thirty-seven (28.7%) respondents were

42

likely to contact county and state emergency management, while, 41 (31.8%) were
unlikely to contact county and emergency management, and 23 (17.8%) were very
unlikely contact county and emergency management (see Table 12).
Eight (6.0%) respondents were very likely to contact Homeland Security about
agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 14 (10.5%) respondents indicated they were fairly
likely to contact Homeland Security. Twenty-seven (20.3%) respondents were likely to
contact Homeland Security, while, 51(38.3%) were unlikely to contact Homeland
Security, and 33 (24.8%) were very unlikely to contact Homeland Security (see Table 12).
Five (3.8%) respondents indicated they would very likely contact state emergency
management for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 13 (9.8%)
respondents indicated they were fairly likely. Thirty-five (26.5%) respondents were likely
to contact state emergency management, while, 49 (37.1%) indicated they were unlikely
to contact state emergency management, and 30 (22.7%) were very unlikely to contact
state emergency management (see Table 12).
Five (3.8%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact county
emergency management for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 10
(7.6%) respondents indicated they were fairly likely. Thirty-six (27.5%) respondents
indicated they were likely to contact county emergency management, while 50 (38.2%)
indicated they were unlikely, and 30 (22.9%) were very unlikely to contact county
emergency management (see Table 12).
Nine (6.8%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact Farm Bureau
for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 19 (14.3%) respondents were
fairly likely to contact Farm Bureau. Forty-eight (36.1%) respondents were likely to
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contact Farm Bureau, while, 31 (23.3%) indicated they were unlikely, and 26 (19.5%)
were very unlikely to contact Farm Bureau (see Table 12).
Eleven (8.3%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact the West
Virginia Beef Council (WVBC) for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while,
14 (10.6%) respondents were fairly likely to contact WVBC. Thirty-four (25.8%)
respondents indicated they were likely to contact WVBC, while, 45 (34.1%) indicated
they were unlikely, and 28 (21.2%) were unlikely to contact the WVBC (see Table 12).
Eighteen (13.3%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact the West
Virginia Beef Cattle Association (WVBCA) for information on agroterrorism and
biosecurity, while, 20 (14.8%) respondents were fairly likely. Thirty-seven (27.4%)
respondents were likely to contact WVBCA, while, 38 (28.1%) indicated they were
unlikely, and 22 (16.3%) were very unlikely to contact WVBCA (see Table 12).
Six (4.5%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact agriculture
teachers for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, six (4.5%) respondents
were fairly likely. Twenty-nine (21.6%) respondents were likely to contact agriculture
teachers, while, 60 (44.8%) indicated they were fairly unlikely, and 33 (24.6%) were very
unlikely to contact agriculture teachers (see Table 12).
Thirteen (9.8%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact the West
Virginia beef specialist for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 16
(12.0%) respondents were fairly likely. Thirty-nine (29.3%) respondents indicated they
were likely to contact the WV beef specialist, while, 45 (33.8%) indicated they were
unlikely, and 20 (15.0%) were very unlikely to contact the WV beef specialist (see Table
12).
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Eight (6.0%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact the West
Virginia University Davis College of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Design for
information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 12 (9.0%) respondents were fairly
unlikely. Thirty-six (27.1%) respondents were likely to contact the West Virginia
University Davis College of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Design, while, 50
(37.6%) indicated they were unlikely, and 27 (20.3%) were very unlikely to contact the
West Virginia University Davis College of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Design
(see Table 12).
Four (3.0%) respondents indicated they were very likely to contact Potomac State
College (PSC) for information about agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, three (2.3%)
respondents were fairly likely to contact PSC. Seventeen (12.9%) respondents were likely
to contact PSC. Sixt-eight (51.5%) indicated they were unlikely to contact PSC, and 40
(30.3%) were very unlikely to contact PSC (see Table 12).
Six (17.6%) respondents indicated they were not very likely to know who to
contact about agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, two (5.9%) respondents were fairly
likely not to know who to contact. Seven (20.6%) respondents indicated they were likely
not to know who to contact, while, nine (26.5%) indicated they were unlikely to know
who to contact, and 10 (29.4%) were very unlikely to know who to contact (see Table 12).
One (14.3%) respondent indicated they were fairly likely to contact others about
agroterrorism and biosecurity. One (14.3%) respondent indicated they were likely to
contact others, while, 5 (71.4%) were very unlikely to contact others. Respondents felt
they would also contact the stockyard (see Table 12).
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Table 12
Likelihood of Contacting Individual or Agency
Very Unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Fairly Likely

Very Likely

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

Veterinarian

3

2.2

19

13.7

35

25.2

23

16.5

59

42.4

Extension agent

9

6.5

16

11.6

50

36.2

24

17.4

39

28.3

West Virginia Dept. of
Agriculture

5

3.7

10

7.4

40

29.4

25

18.4

56

41.2

Another livestock
producer

10

7.4

18

13.3
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34.1

32

23.7

29

21.5

Law enforcement

14

10.3

20

14.7

32

23.5

20

14.7

50

36.8

United States
Department of
Agriculture

12

8.9

31

23.0

36

26.7

22

16.3

34

25.2

Producer Association

23

17.6

43

32.8

37

28.2

15

11.5

13

9.9

State or County
Emergency
Management

23

17.8

41

31.8

37

28.7

17

13.2

11

8.5
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Table 12 (Continued)
Likelihood of Contacting Individual or Agency
Very Unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Fairly Likely

Very Likely

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

Homeland Security

33

24.8

51

38.3

27

20.3

14

10.5

8

6.0

State Emergency
Management

30

22.7

49

37.1

35

26.5

13

9.8

5

3.8

County Emergency
Management

30

22.9

50

38.2

36

27.5

10

7.6

5

3.8

Farm Bureau

26

19.5

31

23.3

48

36.1

19

14.3

9

6.8

West Virginia Beef
Council

28

21.2

45

34.1

34

25.8

14

10.6

11

8.3

West Virginia Beef
Cattleman's
Association

22

16.3

38

28.1

37

27.4

20

14.8

18

13.3

Agriculture Teachers

33

24.6

60

44.8

29

21.6

6

4.5

6

4.5

West Virginia Beef
Specialist

20

15.0

45

33.8

39

29.3

16

12.0

13

9.8
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Table 12 (Continued)
Likelihood of Contacting Individual or Agency
Very Unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Fairly Likely

Very Likely

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

West Virginia
University

27

20.3

50

37.6

36

27.1

12

9.0

8

6.0

Potomac State College

40

30.3

68

51.5

17

12.9

3

2.3

4

3.0

Don't know who I
would contact

10

29.4

9

26.5

7

20.6

2

5.9

6

17.6

Other, please specify

5

71.4

0

.0

1

14.3

1

14.3

0

.0
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Access to Education Material to Answer Beef Cattle Biosecurity Questions
Respondents were asked if they had access to educational materials which could
be used in answering their beef cattle biosecurity questions. Thirty-four (25.8%)
responded that they would have access to education materials, 70 (53.0%) indicated they
would not have access to any educational materials to help answer their beef cattle
biosecurity questions, while, 28 (21.2%) reported they did not know whether they would
have access to educational materials or not (see Table 13).
Table 13
Access to Educational Material to Answer Beef Cattle Biosecurity Questions
N

%

Yes

34

25.8

No

70

53.0

Don't Know

28

21.2

Use of Published Sources for Additional Information about Agroterrorism
Respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood of using various published
sources for information about agroterrorism and biosecurity. Fifty (36.2%) respondents
indicated they were very likely to use a farm magazine for information on agroterrorism
and biosecurity, 26 (18.8%) respondents were fairly likely, and 45 (32.6%) indicated they
were likely to use a farm magazine for information, while, 11 (8.0%) were unlikely, and
six (4.3%) were very unlikely to use a farm magazine for information (see Table 14).
Twenty-seven (20.0%) respondents indicated they were very likely to read a
newspaper for information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 24 (17.8%) would
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fairly likely read a newspaper. Forty-two (31.1%) respondents indicated they were likely
to read a newspaper for information on agroterrorism, while, 30 (22.2%) indicated they
were unlikely, and 12 (8.9%) were very unlikely to read a newspaper for information on
agroterrorism (see Table 14).
Twenty-six (19.4%) respondents indicated they were very likely to use the
Internet to find information on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 28 (20.9%)
respondents indicated they were fairly likely. Thirty (22.4%) were likely, while, 19
(14.2%) indicated they were unlikely, and 31 (23.1%) were very unlikely to use the
Internet to find information on agroterrorism and biosecurity (see Table 14).
Two (1.5%) respondents indicated they would very likely read published library
material to gain knowledge on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, nine (6.8%)
respondents indicated they would fairly likely read library materials. Twenty-three
(17.4%) would likely read published library materials; while, 58 (43.9%) respondents
were unlikely, and 40 (30.3%) were very unlikely to read published library materials to
gain knowledge on agroterrorism and biosecurity (see Table 14).
Forty-four (32.8%) respondents indicate they would very likely go to the
Extension office to get published materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 16
(11.9%) respondents were fairly likely to go the Extension office. Forty-four (32.8%)
indicated they were likely to go to the Extension office, while, 21 (15.7%) indicated they
were unlikely, and nine (6.7%) very unlikely go to the Extension office to get published
materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity (see Table 14).
Thirty-two (23.9%) respondents indicated they were very likely to go to West
Virginia University (WVU) for published materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity,
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while, 23 (17.2%) respondents were fairly likely to contact West Virginia University
(WVU). Thirty-nine (29.1%) respondents were likely to go to West Virginia University
(WVU) for published materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity, while, 29 (21.6%)
indicated they were unlikely to contact WVU, and 11 (8.2%) very unlikely to go to West
Virginia University (WVU) for published materials on agroterrorism and biosecurity (see
Table 14).
Five (45.5%) respondents felt they would very likely find other published material
on agroterrorism and biosecurity, one (9.1%) felt they were likely to find other materials,
and five (45.5%) reported it was very unlikely they would find other materials. Other
published materials respondents felt they would find would be news on television,
veterinarian, VPI, NCBA, RCALF, USDA, WV Farm Bureau, Market Bulletin, and
WVDA (see Table 14).
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Table 14
Likelihood of Using Various Sources of Published Information
Very Unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Fairly Likely

Very Likely

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

Farm Magazine

6

4.3

11

8.0

45

32.6

26

18.8

50

36.2

Newspaper

12

8.9

30

22.2

42

31.1

24

17.8

27

20.0

Internet (World Wide
Web)

31

23.1

19

14.2

30

22.4

28

20.9

26

19.4

Library Publications

40

30.3

58

43.9

23

17.4

9

6.8

2

1.5

Extension Office

9

6.7

21

15.7

44

32.8

16

11.9

44

32.8

West Virginia
University

11

8.2

29

21.6

39

29.1

23

17.2

32

23.9

Other, please specify:

5

45.5

0

.0

1

9.1

0

5

45.5
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.0

Impact of Disease Outbreaks
Beef producers were asked whether or not the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak
in England and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak in the U.S. had any
influence on them improving security on their farm. Seven (5.2%) respondents indicated
that the outbreaks had a strong influence on making their farm more secure, while 20
(14.9%) felt the outbreaks had no influence on their current biosecurity practices. Thirtysix (26.9%) beef producers indicated that the outbreaks influenced their decision on
making their operations more secure, but 19 (14.2%) felt the outbreaks had minimal
influence on their operation. Fifty-two (38.8%) respondents indicated the outbreaks
neither strongly influenced nor minimally influenced their decisions to make their
operation more secure (see Table 15).
Table 15
Extent of Outbreak Influences Decisions Towards Improving Security
N

%

Strongly Influenced

7

5.2

Influenced

36

26.9

Neither

52

38.8

Minimal Influence

19

14.2

No Influence

20

14.9

Program Expectations
Beef producers in West Virginia were asked if they would attend a program about
agroterrorism-biosecurity. Seventy-seven (54.6%) respondents replied that they would
attend a program, 17 (12.1%) indicated they would not attend a program on
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agroterrorism-biosecurity, while, 47 (33.3%) were not sure whether or not they would
attend a program (see Table 16).
Table 16
Attend Program about Agroterrorism-Biosecurity
N

%

Yes

77

54.6

No

17

12.1

Not Sure

47

33.3

Respondents were asked when they would prefer an educational program on
agroterrorism and biosecurity be offered. Ninety-six (78.0%) respondents preferred
evenings for a meeting, 16 (13.0%) respondents preferred weekends, and 11 (8.9%)
indicated they would attend meetings offered weekdays (see Table 17).
Table 17
Preferred Delivery Times
N

%

Weekends

16

13.0

Evenings

96

78.0

Weekdays

11

8.9

Respondents were asked what delivery method they would prefer be used in
delivering information on agroterrorism and biosecurity. Sixty-eight (47.6%) respondents
indicated they preferred to go to dinner meetings, 61 (42.7%) respondents preferred
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printed materials they could read on their own, and 54 (37.8%) indicated they would like
to go to trainings (see Table 18).
Table 18
Preferred Delivery Methods
N

%

Dinner meetings

68

47.6

Read printed materials at your own pace

61

42.7

Trainings

54

37.8

Demonstrations

43

30.1

Lectures

30

21.0

Video-DVD

27

18.9

Fact sheet

25

17.5

One-on-One contact

21

14.7

Books

15

10.5

Take classes on the Internet

13

9.1

Group work

12

8.4

Computer software

8

5.6

Audio cassettes-CDs

5

3.5

Forty-three (30.1%) respondents preferred to watch demonstrations, 30 (21.0%)
indicated a preference for lectures, 27 (18.9%) preferred video-dvds, and 25 (17.5%)
indicated they would like fact sheets to read. Twenty-one (14.7%) respondents indicated
they would prefer one-on-one contact, 15 (10.5%) indicated a preference for reading
books, and 13 (9.1%) indicated they would prefer to take classes on the Internet. Twelve
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(8.4%) respondents felt they would like group work settings, eight (5.6%) preferred
computer software, while, five (3.5%) preferred to listen to audio cassette tapes-cd’s (see
Table 18).
National Animal Identification
Beef producers in West Virginia were asked if their farm was registered in the
animal identification system. Ninety (65.2%) respondents were registered in the national
animal identification system, 33 (23.9%) were not registered, while, 15 (10.9%) were not
sure (see Table 19).
Table 19
Participation in National Animal Identification
N

%

Yes

90

65.2

No

33

23.9

Not sure

15

10.9

Respondents were asked if they had been through the Beef Quality Assurance
(BQA) program. Forty-seven (34.1%) had been through the BQA program, 67 (48.6%)
had not been through the program, and 24 (17.4%) were not sure if they had gone through
the program (see Table 20).
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Table 20
Participation in Beef Quality Assurance Program (BQA)
N

%

Yes

47

34.1

No

67

48.6

Not sure

24

17.4

Respondents were asked how many employees they employed full-time and parttime in their operation. One hundred and twenty-nine (91.5%) respondents reported they
did not have any full-time employees, while, 84 (61.8%) did not have any part-time
employees. Nine (6.4%) respondents had 1 – 2 full-time employees and 46 (33.8%) had1
- 2 part-time employees. One (.7%) had 3 – 4 fill-time employees and five (3.7%) had 3 –
4 part-time employees. Two (1.4%) respondents had more than four full-time employees,
and one (.7%) had more than four part-time employees (see Table 21).
Table 21
Full-time and Part-time Employees of the Farm
Full-time employees

Part-time employees

N

%

N

%

None

129

91.5

84

61.8

1–2

9

6.4

46

33.8

3–4

1

.7

5

3.7

More than 4

2

1.4

1

.7
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CHAPTER V
Summary, Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to determine West Virginia beef cattle producers’
perceptions of their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack. Have they implemented
biosecurity plans, and to what degree? What is West Virginia beef producers’ level of
knowledge about recommended biosecurity measures and where do they get their
information regarding biosecurity practices?
Objectives of the Study
The following objectives were used to guide the research:
1. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an agroterrorism attack.
2. Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef producers.
3. Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk related to bioterrorism
and agroterrorism.
4. Identify where West Virginia beef producers go for information on biosecurity.
5. Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery methods for
receiving information on bioterrorism and agroterrorism.
Summary
Three hundred and fifty-five participants were randomly selected from
participants in the Southern Bull test, Beef Quality Assurance, The West Virginia
Cattleman’s Association, two livestock markets (Weston and South Branch), and the
State Livestock Roundup. Mailed questionnaires were sent to the producers, 156 surveys
out of 355 beef were returned for a response rate of (47.7%).
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Research Objective One – “Identify West Virginia beef producers’ preparedness for an
agroterrorism attack.”
The majority of the respondents were uncertain if they were prepared for an
agroterrorism attack. Most West Virginia beef producers (75%) felt they did not make
any considerable investments to make their operations more secure after September 11,
2001. Beef producers also indicated the previous outbreaks of Foot and Mouth Disease
and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy had no influence or little influence on their
biosecurity measures.
Research Objective Two - “Identify current biosecurity practices of West Virginia beef
producers.”
Most of the West Virginia beef producers agreed that isolating new animals
before introducing them to the existing herd is of major importance in keeping their farm
safe. The majority also indicated they always practice isolating new animals. The beef
producers also agreed that participation in training programs would enable employees to
quickly report and recognize a disease.
Research Objective Three - “Identify West Virginia beef producers’ perceptions of risk
related to bioterrorism and agroterrorism.”
A majority of West Virginia beef producers agreed that an agroterrorism attack
could happen in the United States and in the state of West Virginia, but they were
uncertain if it would happen on their own farm. West Virginia beef producers were also
uncertain on their preparedness for an agroterrorism attack.
The majority of West Virginia beef producers rated loss of income due to market
loss as a considerable threat. The next most popular perceived threat was people
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tampering with the gates and fences. A majority of the farmers did not perceive employee
revenge as a threat.
Research Objective Four - “Identify where West Virginia beef producers go for
information on biosecurity.”
Beef producers in West Virginia indicated they would most likely contact law
enforcement if they suspected an act of agroterrorism. The next individual or agency a
beef producer would contact was the West Department of Agriculture (WVDA), followed
by a veterinarian. The majority of the beef producers were very likely to contact all three
of these agencies or individuals.
A majority of the West Virginia beef producers indicated they would very likely
read a farm magazine to learn information about agroterrorism and biosecurity. The next
most popular means to gather information would be to contact an Extension agent,
followed by contacting West Virginia University (WVU).
Research Objective Five - “Determine West Virginia beef producers’ preferred delivery
methods for receiving information on agroterrorism.”
West Virginia beef producers indicated they would most likely attend evening
meetings for information on agroterrorism, preferably a dinner meeting, followed by
weekend meetings. The beef producers also indicated a preference to read materials at
their own pace, and to attend trainings on agroterrorism and biosecurity.
Discussion
The results in West Virginia confirm the findings by DeGraw (2005) who found
Florida beef producers also have not attended biosecurity workshops. Beef producers in
West Virginia, like those in Florida, have not made considerable investments regarding
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security on their operations following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11,
2001, or following Foot and Mouth Disease and BSE outbreaks. Beef producers in West
Virginia and Florida both indicated they would contact law enforcement if they suspected
an agroterrorism attack on their farm.
West Virginia beef producers indicated that the most important safeguard and the
safeguard most widely practiced on their operation was isolating new animals before
introducing them to the existing herd. While DeGraw (2005), found that Florida beef
producers indicated that limiting visitors was their most important safeguard and the one
safeguard most frequently practiced, while isolating a new animal was second most
popular safeguard.
Other similarities between this study and the DeGraw study found that both West
Virginia and Florida beef producers agreed that an act of agroterrorism could happen in
the U.S. and could happen on their operation. West Virginia producers indicated they
were neutral on whether or not they are prepared for an agroterrorism attack to happen on
their operation, while DeGraw (2005) reported Florida producers do not feel they are
prepared for an agroterrorism attack to happen on their operation.
When sources of information about biosecurity were explored West Virginia beef
producers indicated they would contact a veterinarian about biosecurity questions, while
DeGraw found beef producers in Florida would contact the University of Florida.
However, this study confirms the findings by DeGraw (2004) that beef producers would
look in a farm magazine for published information on biosecurity. When asked about
when they prefer trainings, West Virginia producers’ preferred evening, dinner meetings,
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while DeGraw reports that Florida producers prefer weekend trainings, indicating both do
not desire week-day programs.
This study confirmed many of the findings of DeGraw (2005), even though the
average herd size between the two states varies greatly. West Virginia producers
indicating they have 21-50 animals on their operation, whereas DeGraw reported Florida
producers had 1,000 or more animals on their operation. The difference in herd size does
not seem to impact beef producers lack of perceived preparedness for a biosecurity attack
on their farm. Herd size may be more of an indicator of the producers’ perceived threats.
West Virginia producers with smaller herd sizes, consider loss of income due to market
loss as a considerable threat. However, DeGraw found those producers in Florida where
the average herd was 1,000 head; felt that an animal disease outbreak was much of a
threat to their operation.
Conclusions
Based on the results of the study, the following conclusions were made
1. West Virginia beef producers agree that an agroterrorism attack could happen in
the United States.
2. The majority of West Virginia beef producers always practice isolating new
animals before introducing them to the existing herd.
3. The majority of West Virginia beef producers have never attended a workshop on
biosecurity-agroterrorism.
4. West Virginia beef producers would most likely contact law enforcement for
advice about agroterrorism.
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5. West Virginia beef producers have not made considerable investments to make
their operations more secure.
6. West Virginia beef producers would prefer a farm magazine to read for published
information about agroterrorism and biosecurity.
7. West Virginia beef producers prefer evening trainings, preferably with dinner as a
method to learn about agroterrorism and biosecurity.
8. A majority of West Virginia beef producers indicate they would attend a program
on agroterrorism and biosecurity.
Recommendations
The researcher makes the following recommendations based on the results of this study:
1. Evening/dinner training programs to educate the beef producers on biosecurity
procedures should be considered.
2. More information about biosecurity and agroterrorism should be available to beef
producers in West Virginia.
3. All beef producers should be encouraged to become Beef Quality Assurance
(BQA) certified.
4.

Studies should be conducted on other livestock species in West Virginia to
determine biosecurity practices and educational needs.

5. A study should be conducted to determine the availability and accuracy of
biosecurity information available through various channels.
6. Homeland Security and Extension should consider writing articles for farm
magazines on biosecurity measures, since that is the preferred means of securing
published information on biosecurity.
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April 12, 2010
Dear West Virginia Beef Producers:
As a beef producer you know the importance of keeping your herd safe and free
of diseases. You have an appreciation for the time and effort that goes into your beef herd.
Biosecurity is the key to keeping your herd safe. We are interested in the biosecurity
practices you have implemented on your farm. Please take a few moments and share your
opinions with us.
I am Rebecca Ours, a graduate student in Agricultural and Extension Education at
West Virginia University. Under the direction of my advisor, Dr. Deborah Boone, I am
conducting a research study to determine biosecurity practices currently implemented by
beef producers. The results of this research study will be used to prepare a thesis to
partially fulfill the requirements of a Master of Science degree in Agricultural and
Extension Education. The results will provide insight to other beef producers and
Extension educators about beef producers’ biosecurity practices. West Virginia
University’s IRB acknowledgement of this research is on file.
Participation in this research study, while voluntary, will only take a few minutes
of your time. You may skip any question you are not comfortable answering or may quit
at any point and return the partially completed questionnaire. All information will be held
as confidential as possible. Survey results will be reported in a summary format and
individual responses will not be identifiable. You will notice a code number on the return
envelope. This will be used to identify non-respondents for follow up. This code will be
destroyed before the data are analyzed. There is no penalty and no services will be
withheld if you choose not to participate.
We thank you in advance for your participation in the study. Please return the
completed survey by Wednesday April 28, 2010 using the enclosed envelope. For
questions, you may contact Dr. Boone at debby.boone@mail.wvu.edu or by phone at
304-293-5450 or Rebecca at rours1@mix.wvu.edu. Thank you, we sincerely appreciate
your time and effort.
Sincerely,

Rebecca L. Ours
Graduate Student

Deborah A. Boone, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
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Agricultural Security Risks Survey for Beef Producers
Part 1 – Perceptions about Agroterrorism
Agroterrorism refers to an act of any person knowingly or maliciously using
biological and/or chemical agents as weapons against the agricultural industry and/or the
food supply, or using agricultural chemicals and machinery to perform an act of terrorism
against any segment of the American population.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither Agree or
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Instructions: Using the following Likert scale, rate your opinion on each of the
following statements. Indicate your opinion by circling the letters that best corresponds
to your response: SA – Strongly Agree, A – Agree, N – Neither Agree or Disagree, D –
Disagree, or SD – Strongly Disagree.

1. I think that an act of agroterrorism could
happen somewhere in the United States.

SA

A

N

D

SD

2. I think that an act of agroterrorism could
happen somewhere in West Virginia.

SA

A

N

D

SD

3. I think that an act of agroterrorism could
happen on my operation.

SA

A

N

D

SD

4. I feel prepared for an agroterrorism
attack or some other biosecurity threat to
my operation.

SA

A

N

D

SD
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Part II – Rate the Level of Perceived Threat

Considerable

Much

Some

Little

None

Instructions: Using the following Likert scale, rate the Level of Perceived Threat you
feel for each aspect of your operation. Indicate your opinion by circling the number that
best corresponds to your response: 5 – Considerable threat, 4 – Much threat, 3 – Some
threat, 2 – Little threat, or 1 – No threat.

5.

Water contamination

5

4

3

2

1

6.

Feed contamination

5

4

3

2

1

7.

Animal death

5

4

3

2

1

8.

Animal disease outbreak

5

4

3

2

1

9.

Fertilizer theft/misuse

5

4

3

2

1

10. Employee revenge

5

4

3

2

1

11. Chemical contamination

5

4

3

2

1

12. Zoonotic illness

5

4

3

2

1

13. Loss of income due to market loss

5

4

3

2

1

14. Tampering with facilities

5

4

3

2

1

15. Tampering with fences/gates

5

4

3

2

1

16. Other, please specify:
__________________________________

5

4

3

2

1

(Disease transmitted from animal to human)

Part III – Gaining Knowledge about Agroterrorism
17. Have you attended a workshop or general information session about
biosecurity/agroterrorism?
___ a) Yes, at least once
___ b) More than once
___ c) No
73

18. If you suspected an act of agroterrorism (or breach of security) on your operation,
from whom would you seek advice? (Select the three you would most likely
contact).
___ a) Veterinarian
___ b) Extension Agent
___ c) West Virginia Department of Agriculture
___ d) Another livestock producer
___ e) Law enforcement
___ f) USDA
___ g) Producer Association
___ h) State Emergency Management
___ i) County Emergency Management
___ j) Homeland Security
___ k) Don’t know
___ l) Other (please specify) __________________________________
19. Have you made considerable investments (time, money or effort) to make your
operation more biosecure?
___ a) Yes, before September 11, 2001
___ b) Yes, before and after September 11, 2001
___ c) Yes, after September 11, 2001
___ d) No
___ e) Don’t know
<continued on next page>
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Part IV – Agroterrorism Preparedness
Below is a list of safeguards that one may practice on the farm in order to reduce the
likelihood of loss of production due to disease introduction.
Instructions: To the Left, circle the number which represents your opinion of the
importance of the safeguard to better protect your livestock operation. Indicate your
opinion by circling the number which best reflects your response: 4 – Major Importance,
3 – Moderate Importance, 2 – Minor Importance, or 1 – No Importance. .
To the Right, circle the degree to which you practice the indicated safeguard on your
livestock operation. Indicate your opinion by circling the number which best reflects
your response: 4 – Always Practice, 3 – Moderate Practice, 2 – Rarely Practice, 1 –
Never Practice, or NA – Not Applicable.

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

20. Limiting visitors
21. Requiring a waiting period for
visitors who have been on
another farm
22. Isolating a new animal for
observation before introducing
it to the entire herd.
23. Requiring employees to wear
overalls
24. Requiring employees to wear
shoe covers
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Not Applicable

1

Never

No Importance

2

Rarely

Minor

3

Moderate

Moderate

4

Degree to Which You
Practice

Always

Major

Importance of the
Safeguard

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

4

3

2

1

25. Requiring visitors to use
footbaths
26. Requiring employees to use
footbaths
27. Requiring visitors to wear
gloves
28. Requiring employees to wear
gloves
29. Requiring visitors to stop at a
biosecurity checkpoint before
entering the farm
30. Requiring people entering the
farm to shower before entering
31. Requiring people leaving the
farm to shower before leaving
32. Requiring visitors to disinfect
vehicles entering farm
33. Conducting a background
check on potential hires
34. Have regular meetings with
employees to determine levels
of their satisfaction
35. Participate in training
program(s) that will enable
employees to quickly recognize
and report a disease
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Not Applicable

1

Never

No Importance

2

Rarely

Minor

3

Moderate

Moderate

4

Degree to Which You
Practice

Always

Major

Importance of the
Safeguard

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

4

3

2

1

NA

Very Likely

Fairly Likely

Likely

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

Instructions: Using the following Likert scale, rate the likelihood you would contact the
individual/agency for additional information about agroterrorism or livestock specific
biosecurity threats. Indicate your opinion by circling the number which best reflects your
opinion using: 5 – Very likely, 4 – Fairly likely, 3 – Likely, 2 – Unlikely, or 1 – Very
unlikely.

36. Veterinarian

5

4

3

2

1

37. Extension agent

5

4

3

2

1

38. West Virginia Dept. of Agriculture

5

4

3

2

1

39. Another livestock producer

5

4

3

2

1

40. Law enforcement

5

4

3

2

1

41. United States Department of Agriculture

5

4

3

2

1

42. Producer Association

5

4

3

2

1

43. State or County Emergency Management

5

4

3

2

1

44. Homeland Security

5

4

3

2

1

45. State Emergency Management

5

4

3

2

1

46. County Emergence Management

5

4

3

2

1

47. Farm Bureau

5

4

3

2

1

48. West Virginia Beef Council

5

4

3

2

1

49. West Virginia Beef Cattleman’s Association

5

4

3

2

1

50. Agriculture Teachers

5

4

3

2

1

51. West Virginia Beef Specialist

5

4

3

2

1

52. West Virginia University-Davis College of
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Design

5

4

3

2

1

53. Potomac State College

5

4

3

2

1
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Very Likely

Fairly Likely

Likely

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

54. Don’t know who I would contact

5

4

3

2

1

55. Other, please specify:
______________________________________

5

4

3

2

1

56.

Do you have access to educational material that can answer your beef cattle
biosecurity questions? If you answer “Yes”, please write in the material source in
the blank space below:
___ a) Yes; _________________________________________
___ b) No
___ c) Don’t Know
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Very Likely

Fairly Likely

Likely

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

Instructions: Using the following Likert scale, rate the likelihood you use the following
sources of published information for additional information about agroterrorism or
livestock specific biosecurity threats. Indicate your opinion by circling the number which
best reflects your opinion using: 5 – Very likely, 4 – Fairly likely, 3 – Likely, 2 –
Unlikely, or 1 – Very unlikely.

57. Farm Magazine

5

4

3

2

1

58. Newspaper

5

4

3

2

1

59. Internet (World Wide Web)

5

4

3

2

1

60. Library Publications

5

4

3

2

1

61. Extension Office

5

4

3

2

1

62. West Virginia University

5

4

3

2

1

63. Other, please specify:
___________________________

5

4

3

2

1

64. To what extent has the Foot and Mouth outbreak in England and the December
2003 discovery of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) case in the U.S.
influenced any decisions towards improving the security on your operation?
___ a) Strongly Influenced
___ b) Influenced
___ c) Neither
___ d) Minimal Influence
___ e) No Influence
Part V - Demographics
65. What is your gender?
___ a) Male
___ b) Female
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66.

How many years have you been in the beef cattle business? Select one.
___ a) 1 day – 12 months
___ b) 13 months – 2 years
___ c) 25 months – 3 years
___ d) 37 months – 4 years
___ e) 49 months – 5years
___ f) 61 months – 6 years
___ g) 73 months – 7 years
___ h) More than 7 years

67.

Please select the number of cattle on your production facility during your peak
time of the year (when you are at your highest maximum). Select one.
___ a) 1 – 20 animals
___ b) 21 – 50 animals
___ c) 51 – 100 animals
___ d) 101 – 200 animals
___ e) 201 – 300 animals
___ f) 301 – 500 animals
___ g) 501+ animals

68.

How do you describe yourself?
___ a) Owner/Operator
___ b) Operator on land you own
___ c) Operator on rented/leased land
___ d) Other (specify) __________________________________
Would you attend an educational program about agroterrorism/biosecurity?
___ a) Yes
___ b) No
___ c) Not sure
If an educational program were to concentrate on educating beef producers about
agroterrorism when would prefer delivery method?
___ a) Weekends
___ b) Evenings
___ c) Weekdays

69.

70.
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71.

If an educational program were to concentrate on educating beef producers about
agroterrorism how would you prefer delivery method? Please select your top
three choices:
___ a) Trainings
___ b) Read printed materials at your own pace
___ c) Take classes on the Internet
___ d) One-on-One contact
___ e) Dinner meetings
___ f) Demonstrations
___ g) Computer software
___ h) Lectures
___ i) Video/DVD
___ j) Audio cassettes/CDs
___ k) Group work
___ l) Fact sheet
___ m) Books
Part V – Operation Demographics

72.

How many acres do you own?
___ a) None
___ b) Less than 1 acre to 99 acres
___ c) 100 - 249 acres
___ d) 250 - 499 acres
___ e) 500 - 999 acres
___ f) 1000 - 1999 acres
___ g) 2000 – or more acres

73.

How many acres do you rent/lease?
___ a) None
___ b) Less than 1 acre to 99 acres
___ c) 100 - 249 acres
___ d) 250 - 499 acres
___ e) 500 - 999 acres
___ f) 1000 - 1999 acres
___ g) 2000 – or more acres
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74.

What is the average value of your annual gross receipts for the beef cattle-related
segment of your operation?
___ a) Less than $9,999
___ b) $10,000 - $49,999
___ c) $50,000 - $99,000
___ d) $100,000 – $249,000
___ e) $250,000 – 499, 999
___ f) $500,000 - $999,999
___ g) $1,000,000 – or more

75.

Is your farm registered in the National Animal Identification System?
___ a) Yes
___ b) No
___ c) Not sure

76.

Do you have Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) certification?
___ a) Yes
___ b) No
___ c) Not sure

77.

How many people do you employ on your farm full time? (other than family)
___ a) None
___ b) 1-2
___ c) 3-4
___ d) More than 4
How many people do you employ on your farm part time? (other than family)
___ a) None
___ b) 1-2
___ c) 3-4
___ d) More than 4

78.

Comments:
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If you have any questions regarding this survey please feel free to contact:
Rebecca Ours by email: rours1@mix.wvu.edu or
Dr. Debby Boone at 304-293-5450 or email at debby.boone@mail.wvu.edu

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.
We greatly appreciate your input.
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April 30, 2010
Dear West Virginia Beef Producers:
Several weeks ago, you received a survey, seeking input on your opinions
regarding biosecurity practices as it relates to your beef cattle operation. Your input is
vital to this study and your participation is appreciated. I hope you will take a few
minutes to fill out the survey and return it in the postage paid envelope. As a beef
producer you know the importance of keeping your herd safe and free of diseases. You
have an appreciation for the time and effort that goes into your beef herd. Biosecurity is
the key to keeping your herd safe. We are interested in the biosecurity practices you have
implemented on your farm. Please take a few moments and share your opinions with us.
I am Rebecca Ours, a graduate student in Agricultural and Extension Education at
West Virginia University. Under the direction of my advisor, Dr. Deborah Boone, I am
conducting a research study to determine biosecurity practices currently implemented by
beef producers. The results of this research study will be used to prepare a thesis to
partially fulfill the requirements of a Master of Science degree in Agricultural and
Extension Education. The results will provide insight to other beef producers and
Extension educators about beef producers’ biosecurity practices. West Virginia
University’s IRB acknowledgement of this research is on file.
Participation in this research study, while voluntary, will only take a few minutes
of your time. You may skip any question you are not comfortable answering or may quit
at any point and return the partially completed questionnaire. All information will be held
as confidential as possible. Survey results will be reported in a summary format and
individual responses will not be identifiable. You will notice a code number on the return
envelope. This will be used to identify non-respondents for follow up. This code will be
destroyed before the data are analyzed. There is no penalty and no services will be
withheld if you choose not to participate.
We thank you in advance for your participation in the study. Please return the
completed survey by Monday, May 17, 2010 using the enclosed envelope. For questions,
you may contact Dr. Boone at debby.boone@mail.wvu.edu or by phone at 304-293-5450
or Rebecca at rours1@mix.wvu.edu. Thank you, we sincerely appreciate your time and
effort.
Sincerely,

Rebecca L. Ours
Graduate Student

Deborah A. Boone, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
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Comments

Responses:
Went to WV Beef Expo and no biosecurity measures. Bureaucrats will nothing to help
small operators if a problem happens except shoot them down and talk endlessly about it.
Just like this survey, looks good but nothing real will come of it!

For someone to even think that It Is unlikely to have problems In the Food production
Industry In this Country From terrorists Is Being Foolish. It would Be Very Easy to mess
up Our Food Supply (meats, Etc.). We must Guard Against this to the Point to have our
"Guns" Loaded at all Times. WE have already had some problems From Cattle Rustling.
Since Sept. 11, 2001 Anything can happen. That has Already Been Proven In this
Country. May God Bless America And Its Farmers.
Coveralls & Boots relate to my poultry operation and not my Beef operation.
Thank you! Good Luck in M.S. Program.

I don't want to give the impression that I am not concerned about disease or terrorism but
a lot of farms have a heavy flow of people and automobiles, which make it quite a
difference. I have a small operation, a cow-calf program in which I sell all my calves in a
pool once a year. We take all precautions as far as vaccine and parasite controls are
concerned. Have very few visitors. Extension Service would have the material or know
where to get it.
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With no "feedlot" markets in WV, no assistance available at a "common sense"
practical/logical approach for beef producers. Why worry about agroterrorism? It is also
obvious that the only thing [Commissioner of Agriculture] worries about is the next free
trip w/ [wife]. He certainly has not tried to help in any way the cattle breeders in WV.

I think this is a good survey. I also think we need to educate everyone in the U.S.A. about
agroterrorism. There is too many people n the USA that doesn't even know where there
food comes from. No Farm- No Food.

We do not have a Biosecurity Plan for our farm. To my knowledge the WVU extension
needs to start a program train their agents. Keep up the good work, maybe you can make
a change for the farmers of WV

Good Luck on Your Thesis!

I am 84yrs old and just try to purchase a few cattle to summer on my limited amount of
grazing. Our capacity is 15 to 20 head of yearlings.

Best of Luck w/ your project.

Note: The BSE Case in 2003 was economical disaster for cattle producers, yet Canadian
Border still open. It is hard to take serious a threat of biosecurity when the policy of the
USDA is to continue an open border policy for trade and market access to maintain a
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cheap food supply. If we were really concerned for the safety of our national herds we
would not continue to allow cattle pour across the borders from Canada and Mexico.

If you would have meetings Cedar Lakes would be a great place to have them.

Too old to Farm

Extensions agents in previous years would visit my farm but the last two we've never
seen, only at the fair.

You could get scared about it. But I am not sacred. G.E.M.
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APPENDIX E
Open Ended Responses
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Open Ended Responses
Question 16: Rate the level of perceived threat you feel for each aspect of your
operation.
Responses:
Killing Cattle
Rail trail runs thru farm. The general public is invited there, by government organizations.
Fire
Prices of beef dropping
Question 18 LA: If you suspected an act of terrorism (or breech of security) on your
operation, from whom would you seek advice?
Responses:
Shoot the SOB
FBI wife works there
Handle myself
Question 55 A: The likelihood you would contact the individual/agency for
additional information about agroterrorism or livestock specific biosecurity threats.
Responses:
Stockyard
Question 56: Do you have access educational material that can answer your beef
cattle biosecurity questions?
Responses:
Computer (3)
Computer Internet
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Correll [sic] U. Local Vets, Drovers
County Extension Agent
County Extension Agent Ed Smolder
Don’t Care!
Internet
Ever County High Schools Ag Dept.
Ext. Agent
Extension Agent (3)
Extension Service, They have the material or can get it.
Farm Magazine
Farm Service Agency
Grandson is ext agent
Internet (14)
Internet search
Library
local and state specialist
Magazines
market bulletin
market bulletin W.V.
ON THE WEB
PSU Ag
USDA
USDA Agroterrorism Handbook
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WVDA (2)
WVU (2)
WVU Ag
WVU Extension
Question 68 A: How do you describe yourself?
Responses:
All of the above
Owner/partner
Lease out Ag Land
Co-owner/Operator
Raise beef for own use
Operator-family member
Partnership
Question 69 A: Would you attend an educational program about
agroterrorism/biosecurity?
Responses:
Depends on location and convenience
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